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The return of “The Stranger”: Distance,
proximity and the representation of
identity in domain-specific discourse
Philip Riley
 
Introduction
1 1The theme of the Conference, with its reference to the twin notions of Distance and
Proximity was extremely timely, for two reasons. The first is that the year 2008 marks the
centenary of the first publication of Georg Simmel’s essay “The Stranger” (“Der Fremde”),
in  which  the  opposition  between  geographical  proximity  and  distance  and  social
proximity  and  distance  was  originally  proposed  and  expounded  in  an  explicit  and
theoretically cogent way.  The second is  that  in the month of  March 2008,  when the
Conference was held, for the first time, over half the world’s population came to be living
in cities and it is to Simmel’s works on “The Stranger” and the “Metropolis” that we owe
much  of  our  appreciation  and  understanding  of  the  social  importance  of  that
development, of the impact of urbanisation on interaction, discourse and identity.
 
1. The historical and theoretical context 
2 This article has a double aim: firstly, to set this tiny fragment of Simmel’s work in its
wider historical and theoretical context, since I believe that it is only by doing so that we
can begin to understand why it has had such widespread influence. How has this little
essay – a mere six pages long – come to be seen as relevant to issues in so many different
fields,  including social  interaction,  discourse  analysis,  intercultural  communication,
modernity and urbanism, post-colonialism and identity studies? And, secondly, I will be
looking  at  the  notion  of  ethos as  developed  by  Ruth  Amossy  (1999)  and  the  ‘New
Rhetoricians’ as well as myself and some of my colleagues at the CRAPEL, because I think
The return of “The Stranger”: Distance, proximity and the representation of i...
ASp, 53-54 | 2011
1
that it is a concept which usefully complements or extends a number of Simmel’s ideas
relating to interaction and identity.
3 To begin with, the man himself, Georg Simmel was born in 1848 in the very heart of
Berlin, the corner of Leipziggerstrasse and Friedrichstrasse. As Lewis Coser (1971: 194)
remarks, this is “a curious place – it would correspond to Times Square in New York”. Or
to Piccadilly in London, I suppose. At the same time it could hardly be more fitting for the
future specialist on urban modernity, social space, interaction and identity. Simmel lived
on the cusp of modernity: the telephone, antiseptics, artificial fibres and dyes, the metro,
cars and planes, tinned food, Darwinism, bureaucracy, mass education, these were only
some of the developments which occurred during his lifetime and which, very atypically
for a German intellectual of his time, he subjected to serious analysis.
4 Simmel  was  the  youngest  of  seven  children.  His  father  was  a  prosperous  Jewish
businessman who converted to Christianity but died while Simmel was young and he was
adopted by a friend of the family from whom he inherited considerable wealth. He
studied history and philosophy at the University of Berlin with some of the most eminent
academics of the day and received his doctorate for a thesis on Kant in 1881, by which
time his  extraordinary intellectual  range was  already recognised.  Unlike most  of  his
colleagues, he did not move from one university to another, he stayed at the University of
Berlin as a Privatdozent, an ‘unofficial’ university teacher, paid directly by the students.
5 Like many other commentators, I  feel  that the condensed power and insight of “The
Stranger” owes much to his position as an outsider in his own society. He was a Jew in a
society  where  anti-semitism was  rife.  Despite  his  brilliance  as  a  writer  and teacher,
despite the admiration and support he received from the most eminent minds of his time,
despite a truly international reputation, he failed to obtain a university professorship
until the very end of his life, in 1914, when it was too late. I say ‘despite his brilliance’ –
because of it? Was he, perhaps, “too clever by half”? His all-round brilliance certainly
seems to have offended specialists in some of the fields he touched on so fruitfully. They
were particularly opposed to the new discipline of sociology, partly no doubt just because
it  was new,  but also because they considered it  to have imperialistic  tendencies,  the
desire to monopolise social science and the humanities, and in that, as we shall see, they
were right.
6 Simmel was free to lecture on any subject he wished, a liberty of which he took the fullest
advantage: he gave courses on ethics, poetry, philosophy, sociology, history … and all the
time he attracted enthusiastic audiences. Can’t you just hear his critics’ “Oh, of course
he’s very good with the students”, implying there was something showy and shallow about
him and his ideas? And not only did he produce numerous non-academic publications,
which people actually read, he dealt with topics which, while entirely consistent with his
heavy-duty  theorising,  were  shockingly  trivial  to  his  more  solemn  colleagues:  the
sociology of the meal, the sociology of flirting, of smell, of fashion. Only now is he also
being recognised as a major forerunner of ‘Cultural Studies’.
7 During the First World War, his famed objective rationality sadly gave way to passionate
nationalistic propaganda, a final,  doomed effort to come in from the cold. He died in
Strasbourg in 1918.
8 Simmel was, along with Emil Durkheim (Épinal 1858 – Paris 1917), Max Weber (Erfurt 1864
– Munich 1920),  and Ferdinand Tönnies (Riep 1855 – Kiel  1936),  one of  the founding
fathers of Sociology. Indeed, with Tönnies and Weber, he was one of the founders of the
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German Society for Sociology in 1911. But these people did not live in an intellectual
vacuum. They were themselves the inheritors of a long tradition and a heated debate as
to the feasibility and nature of social science. This debate, known as the Wissenschaftsstreit
(‘science war’) was essentially about epistemology, that is, about the nature of knowledge
and the limits of our understanding. From the Early Modern period onwards, a number of
thinkers had addressed the problem of developing a general science of mankind. Bacon,
More, Vico and Montesquieu are just some of those cited as precursors of what would
later be known as anthropology and sociology. The successes of the physical sciences
(especially from 1750 onwards and exponentially in the nineteenth century) only made
this ambition, this need to establish a rational and systematic study of mankind, more
acute. But those successes also raised the vital question as to what extent this new social
science,  this  Geisteswissenschaft  (‘Humanities’)  would  resemble  the  physical  sciences.
Would its aims and methods be the same? In simple terms, would it aim at objectivity (the
value-free ‘view from nowhere’, based on quantification, measurement and statistics)?
Because of the very considerable advances which had been made, and which could be
seen  influencing  peoples’  daily  lives,  the  temptation  to  adopt  the  physical  science
paradigm was enormously strong.
9 However,  there  were  also  sources  of  resistance,  many  of  which  have  been  bundled
together  under  the  convenient  if  confused  and  confusing  label  ‘Romanticism’.  They
powerfully  influenced  the  Zeitgeist,  but  in  robust  epistemological  terms,  the  most
important source of formative concepts was unquestionably the German hermeneutic
and  phenomenological  tradition,  as  it  evolved  from  biblical  exegesis  into  historical
linguistics, on the one hand, and historiography, on the other. It was then absorbed into
the social sciences in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by a long line of
thinkers, including historians and philosophers (Dilthey, Scheler, Hegel, Husserl, Marx,
Rickert) as well as sociologists. 
10 In very,  very broad outline,  this debate can be boiled down to the following closely-
related points:
1. The  point  of  view  of  the  observer:  Erklären or  verstehen  (Outhwaite  1975)?  What  is  the
ultimate  aim  of  science:  to  explain  the  world,  or  to  interpret  it?  To  provide  objective,
realistic accounts – theories – of the world, laws, physical or social? Or, in the case of social
phenomena at  least,  is  it  to  provide  accounts  of  the  accounts,  to  identify,  describe  and
analyse the interpretative repertoires or world views of the groups which have them?  The
truth or their truth? The truth of the laboratory scientist, standing outside and looking in?
Or the truth of a participant in an event, standing inside looking out? How, for example, can
‘history’ be anything more than an arbitrary list of ‘events’ if we do not understand the
beliefs  and  values,  motivations  and  representations,  the  modes  of  thought  of  the
participants in those events? How can we explain anything, rather than simply recording it?
How can we come to know the past, and others, and the pasts of others? Is a 'social science'
possible, or a contradiction in terms? Is it possible to be objective about subjectivity? 
2. Method: Heuristic or rational? Should “nature be interrogated”, to use Bacon’s really rather
grim expression, physically tortured until she gave up her secrets? And in what language
would  the  interrogation  take  place:  in  the  language  of  mathematics  or  in  that  of  some
alternative epistemology? What should be the instruments of torture? 
3. What counts as data? Data which can be counted, or data that counts? That is, is science
limited to the interpretation of physical data obtained by experimental and quantitative
means? The essential problem here is, of course, consciousness: a chemical product heated
in a test tube does not know it is being interrogated, very often human beings do. Even more
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to the point, consciousness means that individuals are not only of the world but that they
have a world. Where the physical world is made up of ‘facts’ such as stones, animals, bridges,
plants, the conscious world – social reality – is made up of ‘facts’ such as appointments, the
rank of sergeant, Christmas, honour, social facts. Physical objects are language-independent,
but social objects can only exist in and through language and discourse. The third star on
the left goes on shining whether I know its name or not and I am certainly not responsible
for its very existence. But an appointment is something we can make, which only exists
because  we  have  satisfied  a  certain  number  of  requirements  as  to  what  counts  as  an
appointment. We call the appointment into existence. Through communication, it becomes
part of our common, social world. But that world is real, factual, as we soon find out if we
fail to keep an appointment. Can there be a ‘science of appointments’? 
11 In Simmel’s time, the debate as to the nature and feasibility of sociology had become
polarised into an opposition between those who saw its place in the Natural Sciences (
Naturwissenschaft)  and those for  whom it  belonged with the Humanities.  The Natural
Sciences were nomothetic, aiming to establish general laws or truths. In this perspective,
sociology would be an extension, a seamless prolongation – of the aims, methods and
ideology of ‘hard’ science: social statistics. This organicist approach was also taken to
imply that everything mankind does or thinks – philosophy, economics, etc. – is part of
society and all grist to the sociologist’s mill.
12 The Humanities were seen by many scholars as idiographic. In this perspective, there is no
such thing as ‘society’, only individuals involved in unique events. One might almost call
this approach an anti-sociology, since it denies the possibility of extrapolating from the
particular to the general. From this point of view, individual subjectivities and experience
are so profoundly anchored in unique historical contexts – specific and irrecoverable
configurations of place,  time,  individual,  motivation and event – that any attempt to
systematise them is doomed to failure (a failure,  of  course,  which contributes to the
general Romantic gloom about individuals and their destinies. Only great artists whose
genius makes them aware of this state of affairs are granted flashes of insight into ‘the
truth’, but flashes of insight, along with revealed knowledge, do not count as ‘science’).
13 One is tempted to describe these two extremes as megalomaniac and defeatist: on the one
hand,  we have  a  claim that  sociology is  all-embracing.  On the  other  hand,  we have
surrender:  sociology is  impossible.  So this was the fundamental  problem Simmel was
facing: How can we establish general laws on the basis of unique events, and how can we
study unique, social events as the manifestation of general laws?
14 Simmel’s answer to this question was highly original. He rejected both the nomothetic
and the  idiographic  approaches.  He  proposed a  third way,  one  which very  carefully
dissociated itself from both the megalomaniac pretensions of the hard science approach
and from the ineffectual pessimism of the Romantics. He invented interaction.  Not the
word itself, which had existed in English and German since the 1860s in hard science
contexts (where it was used to refer to interactions between atoms and chemicals), but
interaction  as  the  defining  social  phenomenon,  the  mutually  influencing  behaviours
which explain, to quote the title of another of his articles “How is society possible?” How
can we go from being individuals,  in the most rudimentary sense of having separate
bodies  and  no  knowledge  of  others,  to  being  members  of  society,  competent  and
recognised members of groups.
15 It is this capacity, says Simmel, and the behaviours which manifest it which is the major,
the defining object of study of sociology:
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Society is merely the name for a number of individuals connected by interaction …
sociology asks what happens to men and by what rules they behave … insofar as
they  form  groups  and  are  determined  by  their  group  existence  because  of
interaction. (Simmel in Wolff [1908] 1950: 10-11)
16 For  his  account  of  sociation  to  be  adequate,  he  developed  a  precisely-defined
interpretative repertoire. He borrowed another term from contemporary chemistry: the
dyad.  In  chemistry,  the term refers  to  a  pair  of  atoms which have joined to  form a
molecule,  which are in a  chemical relationship.  In Simmel’s  sociology,  it  refers  to an
interactive pair, two individuals involved in a meaningful social relationship. The unit of
sociation he called the dyad. The relationship he called intersubjectivity.
17 Intersubjectivity is the psycho-social state obtained between the members of a dyad as a
result of communicative behaviour. It has been defined as a “reciprocity of perspectives”,
but perhaps it  is  easier to understand as “shared meaning”,  or even more simply as
“communication”.  At  the  risk  of labouring  the  point,  it  is  worth  remembering  that
‘communication’ means ‘making common’. 
18 For Simmel, then, sociology is not so much the study of society as the study of sociation,
the process of forming groups through interaction. Interactions take place “among the
atoms of society”, individuals, to produce dyads and wider structures and institutions
such as the family, trades unions, cities, associations like GERAS, armies. Studying these
structures is a perfectly valid concern and constitutes the greater part of mainstream
sociology from Durkheim and Weber onwards.  But Simmel preferred to focus on the
behaviour which produced and maintained them, interaction as the matrix of the social.
He refuted the idiographists’ claims that all human events are unique and therefore not
amenable to systematic study, by demonstrating that, on the contrary, if those events
were studied as instances of interaction, it was perfectly possible to establish general
rules since the forms of interaction which underlie different patterns of sociation are
regular and limited in number.
19 Simmel argued, then, that the sociologist’s task was not to study an individual, however
important he or she might be historically. What King John had for breakfast or even the
battles he fought are irrelevant sociologically speaking. The issue for the sociologist is
Kingship  and  the  relations  of  Superordination  /subordination  which  determine  the
interactions between King and subject. In other words, the sociologist’s task is to study
King John and not King John. 
20 More generally, Simmel insists that all such relationships are necessarily dialectical, any
category  of  identity  is  in  complementary  opposition to  another  or  others.  King  and
subject, parent and child, teacher and pupil, baker and customer. You cannot study the
sound of one hand clapping: it takes two to interact. In order to investigate the process of
sociation,  Simmel  needed  to  identify  the  members  of  his  dyad,  since  the  forms  of
interaction vary according to who is interacting with whom. But the identities in question
must be social identities, not individual identities or otherwise he would fall into the
idiographic trap – unique events and actors, with no possibility of making general laws.
So what he did was to invent a new conceptual tool, the ‘ideal type’ or ‘social type’. Social
types are categories of person defined according to their relationships with others, which
I interpret as categories of social identity. These relationships can be specified in terms of
the  expectations  of  and  reactions  to  the  type’s  behaviour.  These  behaviours  fix  the
individual’s position within the social matrix.
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21 The ‘ideal type’ was immediately seized on by other sociologists, by Weber in particular
and then just about everybody, and is still central to sociological thought and analyses.
However, over the last century or so it has been refined and (in the contexts we are
discussing) is probably more familiar to us as ‘role’ or ‘status’. In fact so familiar that we
tend to forget that this was a major intellectual achievement.
22 Simmel’s ideal social types include: the King, the Poor man, the Mediator, the Renegade,
the Adventurer … and the Stranger.
23 The Stranger, then, is an ideal type, an identity category. It is an abstraction and an
idealisation. Like any other such category, it  obliges or enables individuals to occupy
specific discursive positions, our place in society. I should really say ‘places’, of course,
because real-life individuals play a variety of roles as they go along: customer at the
baker’s, husband and grandfather, teacher, member of a choir or football team. But that is
precisely the point: Simmel’s Stranger is not a real-life individual, it is an abstraction, an
analytic tool for isolating certain specific forms of interaction. 
24 The position of the Stranger is determined by two sets of co-ordinates, social and spatial,
each of which varies along a proximal-distal axis: social and spatial distance, social and
spatial  proximity.  Simmel  brilliantly anticipates  Lakoff  and Johnson’s  work (1980)  on
conceptual metaphors, those cognitive structures for the organisation of experience which
provide a  basis  for  the  generation  of  linguistic  structures  which  are  metaphors  for
expressing experience. Together, conceptual and linguistic metaphors extend the range of
meanings  of  which  we  are  capable.  They  enable  us  to  grasp  experience,  to  make  it
understandable. 
25 Indeed, my previous sentence is a clear example of a conceptual metaphor at work. We
regularly  use  words  whose  literal  meaning  is  related  to  ‘holding’  or  ‘manipulating’
physical objects to express metaphorically mental operations such as understanding: as I
just remarked
We grasp experience. (cf. saisir in French) 
Chomsky holds that language has a genetic basis. 
I take your point. 
She handles ideas easily. 
Statistical manipulation 
Etymologically,  from Latin ‘-prehendere’,  to seize:  Apprehend,  comprehend
(‘grasp with the mind’, OED)
26 Simmel’s Proximity/Distance metaphor falls into the category of what Lakoff and Johnson
call  spatialisation metaphors. In this case, there is a metaphorical extrapolation from
physical  Proximity and  Distance  to  social,  relational  or  interpersonal  Proximity  and
Distance.
A close / distant relative 
She keeps her distance. 
He’s stand-offish. 
He’s very approachable. 
He doesn’t let anyone get near him.
27 Underpinning Simmel’s argument is the assumption that physical Proximity and Distance
and social Proximity and Distance are metaphorically equivalent, an assumption which in
his time was very largely confirmed by experience. It has been calculated that when the
first passenger train networks were established in Europe in the 1850s, the vast majority
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of the population had never been further than ten miles from their home village. But by
deconstructing that metaphor,  Simmel was able to provide a descriptive and analytic
framework which could be adapted to account for other cases, other configurations of
social  and  physical  Proximity  and  Distance. Together  with  this  framework,  and  by
focussing on the forms of sociation (types of interaction) he was able to demonstrate
similarities and regularities across a range of what at first glance seemed to be highly
disparate  situations.  Simmel’s  analytic  framework,  although  ostensibly  dealing  with
‘foreigners’ or ‘migrants’, can be profitably generalised to any situation where ‘outsiders’
interact with ‘insiders’,  as we can see if  we look at some of the related-but-different
situations which have been examined in the light of his model (cf. Schütz 1944):
The new recruit in the army 
The university student who returns to his home village to find something
has changed 
The new fiancée being inducted into his or her family of in-laws 
The young researcher hoping to be recognised as a qualified and competent
member  of  a  professional  or  disciplinary  community  of  practice.
(professional mobility) 
The  candidate  wishing  to become  a  member  of  an  exclusive  club  (social
mobility) 
The son of the farmer who goes to college (educational mobility) 
The town-dweller who moves to the countryside (geographical mobility) 
The members of a family of impoverished workers moving to a town where
an economic boom is in progress (economic mobility).
28 This list clearly illustrates Simmel’s main point, namely that what look like very different
or even unique events can be shown to have commonalities if analysed as patterns of
sociation  and  interaction,  of  generalisable  social  relationships.  Like  many  really
important insights, this one has become so widely accepted that it is very difficult for use
to appreciate how much of a breakthrough it was at the time.
29 Simmel's theorisation of the Stranger is deceptively simple. He suggests that the category
can be characterised or situated along four parameters:  position in space, position in
time, social position and relational position. In a remarkable anticipation of postmodern
theory and discourse analysis, he argues that these positions are instantiated by specific
forms of interaction and discourse. The Stranger, then, is characterised by:
1. Position in space: the Stranger is both wandering and fixed: spatial relations ‘are the condition …
and the symbol ... of human relations. 
2. Position in time: The person who comes today and stays tomorrow … a person without a history. 
3. Social position: For Simmel, the Stranger, paradoxically, ‘like the poor and sundry “inner enemies”
is an element of the group itself while not being part of it … To be a Stranger is naturally a very
positive relation: it is a specific form of interaction’. 
4. Relational position: ... is determined, essentially, by the fact that he has not belonged to it from the
beginning, that he imports qualities into it, which do not and cannot stem from the group itself.
(Simmel [1908] 1950: 402-408)
30 Every one of these points was subsequently taken up and developed on the basis of social
typology  by  later  sociologists.  Indeed,  almost  every  important  twentieth  century
sociologist  has  at  some time or  another  addressed the problem of  the Stranger,  the
majority of them basing their approach on the notion of social type. For some – in the
USA in particular – it was the focal point of their work. Even the most summary outline of
the  literature  in  question  would  have  to  include  reference  to  at  least  the  following
authors and concepts: Park ‘The Marginal Man’ (1928); Stonequist, ‘The Marginal Man’
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(1937);  Wood  ‘The  Newcomer’  (1934);  Hughes  ‘Unequal  Man’  (1949);  Siu,  ‘Sojourner’
(1952) … Murphy-Lejeune (2002) ‘Les étudiants voyageurs’.
31 However, as the Stranger made his journey from Europe to the USA, he underwent a
transformation. For Simmel and the other Germans, including Schütz (see below), the
focus was on the experience of  being a foreigner:  They tried to develop an insider's
perspective on how individuals come to terms with being a Stranger, how, in interactive
behaviour do you ‘do’ being a Stranger. Their analysis, that is, is based on the idea of
linguistic and social negotiation (and consequently is rich in its implications for foreign
language pedagogy). For the American pragmatists of the Chicago school, however, the
focus is a very different one indeed. Writing from the perspective of the host community,
they ask questions like: what impact will these strangers have on our community? How
should we receive and deal with them? How can we make them more like us?
32 These two sets of questions – how do I do being a competent stranger and how do I
become a member of the community – bring us to the heart of ESP or of domain-specific
discourses in general, not in linguistic but rather in sociolinguistic terms. Not, that is, in
terms of the internal structures of the linguistic code – morphology, syntax and so on –
but in terms of the various kinds of rhetorical and argumentative strategies employed by
speakers and writers in order to be recognised, to have their credentials accepted, to be
believed, as competent members of the community in question. In Simmel’s terms, what
are the forms of sociation which characterise interactions of this kind and how can they
influence the degree of social proximity? That question has been reformulated a number
of times over the past century, but whether the vocabulary used is ‘in-group and out-
group’  or  ‘periphery  and  centre’,  ‘inclusion  and  exclusion’,  essentially  they  are  all
variations  of  Simmel’s  original  insights,  though  each  of  these  approaches  has  also
provided  insights  of  its  own,  of  course.  So  what  vindicates  Simmel’s  approach  –
interaction and ideal types – is the fact that although his Stranger was a very specific sub-
category of outsider (the cosmopolitan Jew, in many ways a self-portrait) his theoretical
model has been fruitfully applied to a range of other sub-categories, some of which did
not even exist in his time.
33 An example from the field of urban sociology concerns the emergence of the modern
identity category ‘the commuter’ and recent studies (Castells 1999) of the ways in which
other factors related to globalisation – developments in telecommunications for example
– may be working in an opposite direction, by re-establishing the identity of workplace
and home which preceded the industrial  revolution.  When we remember that  it  was
precisely the dissociation between workplace and home that did so much to determine
gender roles in nineteenth-century Britain – masculine and feminine spheres of power
and interest – we begin to appreciate just how tight the fit is between configurations of
social and physical Proximity and Distance, on the one hand, and categories of identity on
the other.
34 I  mentioned  telecommunications  a  moment  ago,  and  of  course  one  of  the  powerful
instruments  for  reconfiguring  Distance-Proximity  relations  is  the  telephone  itself,
especially the ‘mobile’. To understand just how different Simmel’s world was from ours,
and  to  appreciate  just  how  perspicacious  his  analysis  was,  consider  the  following
anecdote.  In  the  1880s  in  Britain,  when  the  first  telephone  exchange  was  being
established in London, it was suggested to the Prime Minister, Gladstone, that he might
wish to have a telephone set on his desk in Downing Street. His first reaction was to ask
what a telephone was. “Prime Minister, it is an instrument for speaking to people at a
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distance.” His reply, which I suggest merits careful reflection, was “Why on earth should I
want to speak to someone who isn’t in the same room as me?”
35 Let us look very briefly at some of the strategies speakers and writers use to position
themselves, to negotiate identities.
a) Explicit Identity claim
I’m a teacher. 
I’m one of those people who … 
Speaking as an anthropologist … 
As a lifelong Chelsea supporter … 
Being a taxpayer, I … 
We are playing Arsenal this afternoon. 
Us Londoners … 
As a lawyer and mother of three …
36 This seems simple enough, I know. But when supervising theses, I have often been struck
by the difficulty even very advanced students have in identifying themselves in this way
with respect to their discipline – “Speaking as an anthropologist”, “as an applied linguist“
and so on. On the one hand, they simply do not perceive themselves in this way. On the
other,  they  are  afraid  of  seeming  pretentious  or  of  being  slapped  down.  When  I
questioned one of my students about this, she said “Oh, I couldn’t say that, I wouldn’t
dare, not until after I’ve got my doctorate, then I can”.
b) Implicit Identity claims (‘Knowledge claims’)
37 A  less  direct  but  powerful  form  of  identity  claim  is  to  lay  claim  to  knowledge  or
experience. 
Anyone who works in higher education knows … 
Look, I spent my childhood in Kenya …
38 One important kind of knowledge is who you know:
I was talking to Angelina and Brad the other day …
39 An experienced and self-confident member of an academic discourse community may
formulate an elaborate knowledge-based identity claim:
No-one with a life of finite duration could hope to be an expert on the entire œuvre
of  figures  as  prodigiously  productive  and  diverse  as  Freud,  Marx,  Durkheim,
Helmholtz, the contemporary structuralist or post-structuralist thinkers, or to have
an  intimate  first-hand  acquaintance  with  contemporary  ethological,
anthropological, archaeological, etc. writing.The only areas where I can lay claim to
any  kind  of  expertise  are  in  twentieth-century  American  and  European  philosophical
thought, the writings of post-Saussurean theorists and modern biology and medicine.(Tallis
1997: xiii, my emphasis)
40 In domain-specific discourse, these strategies may also take the form of bibliographical
references and of technical vocabulary:
Fully validated modules for oesophago-gastric cancers: 
QLQ–OES18: Blazeby J et al. Eur J Cancer 2003; 39: 1384-94 
QLQ–STO22: Vickery C et al. Eur J Cancer 2004; 40: 2260-8 
QLQ–OG25: Lagergren P et al. Eur J Cancer 2007; 43: 2066-73
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41 The topoi and contours of language variation serve as an iconic representation of the
forms and configurations of identity available to those individuals recognised as
possessing the competence to use them. Or, to put it in simpler terms, to use a word like
‘phoneme’ is to lay a claim to knowledge about linguistics, to be a linguist.
c) Identification strategies (‘positioning’)
42 As we negotiate identities, jostling for social and discursive positions, we also frequently
try to nudge or force our interlocutors into accepting our definition of their identity: 
- Are you ready to order, sir? 
- Open wide. 
- Tickets please. 
- Next patient, please. 
- Compare and contrast. 
- Why do you Northerners (women, Catholics, teachers, etc.) always … 
- You BBC luvvies are all the same. 
- Business Class passengers only. 
- Staff only. 
- Pregnant women should consult their doctors before using this medicine. 
- There’s a good girl! 
- Big boys don’t cry. 
- Corporal! 
- Asylum seekers should go directly to Desk C.
43 Let us look a little more closely at the expression of identity in domain-specific texts.
Summarising analyses carried out by a number of writers over the last few years, one can
draw  up  the  following  list  of  explicit  and  implicit  identity  strategies  in  academic
discourse:
(i) Explicit: 
author’s professional rank or status 
author’s institutional affiliation 
contact information (surface mail, email) 
acknowledgements 
biodata 
bibliobiodata
(ii) Implicit: 
Choice of title 
Length of text 
Use of first-person pronouns 
Use of epistemic modality markers 
Positioning of self, reader and others: 
- identification and identity claims 
- claiming  credibility of the self 
- claiming credibility for the research 
Use of verbs implying specific role for the author.
44 It is not possible to go into details about each of these items, though in the context of a
discussion of authorial ethos each of them can be shown to be relevant. If we take the
‘explicit strategies’  as a group, for example,  the presence of the expressions ‘rank or
status’  and  ‘affiliation’,  provide  very  different  opportunities  for  ethos  construction:
‘Regius  Professor  of  History  at  the  University  of  Cambridge’  somehow  carries  more
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weight than ‘Doctoral candidate, Middletown College’. Similarly, an acknowledgement to
‘Noam Chomsky for his time and enthusiasm’ is more impressive than thanks expressed
to a colleague readers have never heard of. Biodata and bibliodata full of awards, visiting
professorships  and  previous  titles  will  also  considerably  bolster  reputations  and
expectations. Turning to implicit strategies, it is clear that those related to ‘positioning’
cover  a  wide  and  important  range  of  rhetorical  moves  through  which  authors  can
increase proximity with their readers. In one way or another, these moves all aim to show
that  the  writer  possesses  the  knowledge  necessary  to  be  recognised  as  a  competent
member of  the epistemic community in question:  these include the unexplained and
accurate use of technical terms, acronyms, etc.; familiarity with the background to the
field,  including earlier  texts,  names  and projects,  often referred to  with little  or  no
elaboration;  allusions  to  methodological  and  theoretical  principles  and  procedures;
mastery of the norms of intra- and extratextual reference, citation, exemplification and
material presentation and of the disciplinarily relevant argumentative structures (e.g.,
IMRAD) – and avoidance of generically inappropriate expression, which may include self-
revelation,  ad  hominem  criticism,  non-standard  language,  rhetorical  questions,
exclamation marks and jokes.
45 All the strategies we have been looking at serve to form or position identities, our own or
our interlocutors’. However, if we want to benefit fully from Simmel’s insights, if we want
our  account  of  interaction  and  identity  to  be  truly  intersubjective,  it  needs  to  be
completed by an approach or notion of some kind that will treat them as dyadic and not
as the equivalent of one hand clapping, which is why I am now turning to the notion of
ethos.
 
2. Ethos
46 The crucial difficulty in defining identity is the fact that the term is used in two very
different, and for many observers, irreconcilable ways.
47 On the one hand, ‘identity’ is used to refer to what makes me different from every other
individual. Me myself. But on the other hand, it is used to refer to what I have in common
with others, my membership of certain groups, my similarity to other members: I am
British,  a  man,  a  pensioner,  a  speaker  of  certain  languages,  a  lapsed  Catholic  and
supporter of Chelsea, and so on. For the sake of argument, can we agree to call these two
aspects of personal identity Self and Person.
48 So  far,  so  good.  What  we  have  here  is  essentially  an  updated  account  of  Aristotle’s
observation that man is zoon politikon, a political or social animal. Each of us is at one and
the same time a separate, physically embodied individual and a member of society, of
groups.  In Simmel’s own words:  “Man is both social  link and being for himself,  both
product of society and life from an autonomous centre”. 
49 But there is something missing, isn’t there? How are the two related?
50 This is, I believe, precisely where Simmel and Aristotle come to the rescue. By developing
the Aristotelian concept of ethos, it is possible to integrate Simmel’s notions of sociation,
interaction, intersubjectivity and the dyad/communication.
51 Ethos, you may remember, is one of the three pillars of Aristotelian rhetoric, along with
logos (argument) and pathos (emotion). Ethos is communicative identity. It is an amalgam
of speaker identity (who I am and who I want to be taken for) and perceived identity (who
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you think I am and who you take me for). It is being used by discourse analysts to refer to
the self-image projected by a speaker in and through his or her discourse, but also as it is
filtered  through  the  hearer's  perceptions,  expectations  and  values,  especially  as
constrained by social roles and genres: it is interpreted self-expression, the rhetorical and
socio-psychological  product  of  mutually  influencing  communicative  behaviours  and
judgements. While I am here speaking I rather hope that the impression I am making on
you is one which – if you had to put it into words – you would describe as ‘convincing’,
say, ‘intelligent’ or ‘well-informed’. Unfortunately for me, I am not in a position to impose
those impressions unilaterally. For all I know, you are sitting there searching through the
antonyms in your mental lexicon: ‘boring’, ‘pretentious’, ‘ignorant’, and so on.
52 It  is  usually  glossed  as  the  credibility,  reliability  or  trustworthiness of  character  that  a
speaker or writer adopts or projects towards their audience. Arguments and information,
speech acts and declarations of moral and emotional engagement only have value for
hearers to the extent that they can trust the person expounding them. Hearers, in order
to  arrive  at  a  valid  interpretation  of  the  speaker's  utterances,  need  to  relate  those
utterances to the context. And the most fundamental question in any situation is, who is
speaking  to  me?  And  can  they  be  relied  on?  Ethos  is  the  product  of  this  ongoing
assessment of  performance.  It  is  at  the heart  of  all  expressive behaviours and is  the
essential and necessary starting-point for all interpretation.
53 In  this  socioconstructionist  approach  to  identity  (Mead  1934;  Vygotsky  1978),  the
architecture  of  personhood  and  the  individual  psyche  is  seen  as  the  product  of  an
intrapersonal dialogue between the Self and the Me, the forms of which are determined
and  learned  by  the  communicative  practices  acquired  in  and  through  interpersonal
dialogue, intersubjective couplings. In this perspective, the Me is seen as the individual's
personal perception of his or her social identity. Membership of these groups forms a
bundle of roles and discursive positions which the Self may occupy, though with varying
degrees of choice and awareness. Public perceptions of the Me and of a person's social
identity form ethos.
54 The Self, Ethos and the Person have different temporal or existential orientations: the
Self is fundamentally diachronic, as the locus of the individual's memories, providing the
sense  of  continuity  and  a  historical  site  for  ongoing  experience.  The  person  is
fundamentally synchronic (though often highly repetitive), it is the account of successive
discursive positions or roles. And between them, as it were, we have ethos, the past-in-
the-present,  judgements  as  to  and  of  present  performance  in  the  light  of  previous
knowledge and contacts, including public reputation and stereotypes (see table 1).
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Table 1. The Self, Ethos and the Person
 
Conclusion
55 During his lifetime and for fifty years after his death many serious sociologists regarded
Simmel  as  a  brilliant  failure  because  neither  he  nor  anyone else  had developed the
intellectual and methodological tools necessary to analyse the process of sociation, to
analyse interaction and discourse. I think that we can now claim, without undue hubris,
that that is no longer the case. If we look at the field of sociolinguistics in general and
discourse  analysis  in  particular,  we  can  find  a  number  of  approaches  which  have
developed accurate and powerful procedures, rapidly and satisfactorily filling in the gap.
(An excellent survey of approaches to discourse and identity is Benwell and Stokoe 2007).
• Variationist Sociolinguistics (Labov 1972; Trudgill,1974) 
• The ethnography of communication: Communicative practices (Hymes, 1970; Gumperz 1983;
Hanks 1996; Joseph 2004) 
• Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis (Sacks 1992; Schegloff 1991, Jefferson 2007)
• Membership Categorisation Analysis (Antaki & Widdicombe 1998; Pepin 2006).
• Positioning Theory (Davies & Harré 1990).
56 In the latter half of the twentieth century, the term 'discourse' came to have two very
different  meanings.  On the  one  hand,  it  was  used  by historians  and social  theorists
interested  in  the  conditions  of  production  of  ideologies  (‘grand  narratives’,
‘representations’ and so on), an essentially Marxist approach in which forms of thought
and  identity  are  generated  by  socio-economic  structures.  This  ‘top-down’  social
determinism has  become one of  the commonplaces  of  post-modernist  philosophy,  as
encapsulated in Louis Althusser's dictum that “Ideologies interpellate individuals”. On
the other hand, discourse was understood as language in use, ‘situated language’. This
essentially ‘bottom-up’, anthropological approach involves the examination of actually-
occurring  data,  a  task  of  great  complexity  since  it  involves  the  identification  and
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description of the communicative practices and their linguistic forms and functions, as
well as the social constraints under which they operate, which social members employ in
constructing social reality together in intersubjective couplings.
57 Ideally, one would like to see an integrated approach, one in which specific forms of
interaction could be shown to be instantiations of ‘ideologies’, whilst at the same time
taking into account in a non-determinist way the participants' awareness of themselves
as agents enacting identities. That is, we would have a theory of the relationship between
identity and discourse that was at one and the same time an account of the ways in which
identities are shaped and performed in and through discursive practices and a theory of
self-expression, of the knowing subject. What I have tried to do in this paper to indicate
how a certain number of ideas, a framework for understanding how society emerges from
interaction, first proposed by Georg Simmel a century ago, can help us achieve this aim.
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NOTES
1.  This article includes extracts from Riley (2007).
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ABSTRACTS
The  year  2008  marks  the  centenary  of  the  first  publication  of  Georg  Simmel’s  essay  “The
Stranger” (“Der Fremde”), in which the opposition between geographical proximity and distance
and social  proximity and distance was originally proposed and expounded in an explicit  and
theoretically  cogent  way.  This  article  aims,  first,  to  set  the essay in  its  wider  historical  and
theoretical context, arguing that Simmel’s apparatus for delimiting and describing the field of
sociology,  which  included  such  seminal  notions  as  ‘interaction’,  ‘sociation’,  ‘the  dyad’  and
‘intersubjectivity’, remains relevant to the investigation of the relationships between discourse
and identity.  Secondly,  it  is  argued that  recent  work on the  concept  of  ethos,  or  rhetorical
identity, provides a valuable complement to Simmel’s approach and is helpful in understanding
certain characteristics of domain-specific discourse.
L’année 2008 marque le centenaire de la première parution de l’essai de Georg Simmel intitulé
« L’étranger »  (« Der  Fremde »)  dans  lequel  l’opposition  entre  la  proximité  et  la  distance
géographiques  et  la  proximité  et  la  distance  sociales  est  présentée  pour  la  première  fois  et
exposée dans un cadre théorique explicite et convaincant. Cet article vise tout d’abord à replacer
cet essai dans son contexte historique et théorique plus vaste ; il soutient que l’appareil critique
de Simmel, qui lui permet de délimiter le champ de la sociologie et de le décrire et qui comprend
des  notions  essentielles  comme  « l’interaction »,  la  « sociation »,  la  « dyade »  et
l’« intersubjectivité », reste pertinent pour étudier les relations entre le discours et l’identité.
Dans une seconde partie,  l’auteur souligne que de récents travaux sur le concept d’ethos,  ou
identité  rhétorique,  complètent  utilement  l’approche  de  Simmel  et  aident  à  comprendre
certaines caractéristiques du discours spécifique à un domaine.
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